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____________
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____________
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____________
On Petition for Review from an
Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(Board No. A36 885 101)
Immigration Judge Irma Lopez-Defillo
____________
Argued May 12, 2006
Before: FISHER, COWEN and ROTH*, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: June 15, 2006)
Eszart A. Wynter (Argued)
27 Estate Whim
P.O. Box 1847
Frederiksted, St. Croix
USVI 00841-1847
Attorney for Petitioner

*

The Honorable Jane R. Roth assumed senior status on May 31, 2006.

Ernest F. Batenga
Office of United States Attorney
1108 King Street, Suite 201
Christiansted, St. Croix
USVI 00820
Richard M. Evans
Allen W. Hausman (Argued)
United States Department of Justice
Office of Immigration Litigation
P.O. Box 878
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044
Attorneys for Respondent
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Brian Elmour petitions for review of the legality of his deportation. We will deny
the petition.
Elmour, a 43 year-old citizen of Great Britain who has lived continuously in the
United States for the past 42 years, pled guilty on September 14, 2001, in the Territorial
Court of the Virgin Islands, to assault. On October 21 of that year he was given a
suspended sentence of three years’ imprisonment. On November 14, 2002, Elmour was
arrested by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and served with a Notice To
Appear, charging that his crime was an aggravated felony that rendered him deportable.
Facing removal proceedings, Elmour moved on December 18, 2002, to modify or reduce
his sentence. (A sentence of at least a year was a statutory predicate for his deportation,
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see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1101(a)(43)(F).) Under Virgin Islands Territorial
Court rules, the filing period for such motions runs for 120 days following sentencing.
Because Elmour’s motion was filed well outside that period, the court denied the motion
as untimely. Elmour then filed a motion to withdraw his plea on grounds of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a motion for which the local rules do not set a filing period.
Elmour alleged that while he wanted to go to trial with a self-defense claim, his trial
counsel assured him that his plea would have no immigration consequences. The Virgin
Islands courts denied his motion, and Elmour appealed that denial to this Court. That
appeal remains pending. It is not, however, the subject of this case.
This case concerns a habeas petition Elmour filed on August 6, 2004, in the
District Court, which was subsequently converted to a petition for review and transferred
to this Court under the REAL ID Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). In that petition, Elmour
challenges the legality of his detention and removal by the government. His ground for
this challenge is the pendency of the appeal described above. The instant petition does
not and cannot reach the merits of the ineffective assistance claim. It seeks instead a stay
of removal pending adjudication of Elmour’s appeal of the denial of his motion to
withdraw his plea; as the petition puts it, “the constitutional violations need to be
addressed before Petitioner is incarcerated and removed.”
The District Court granted a stay of removal “until the Court has an opportunity to
determine the merits of Elmour’s petition.” The District Court held a hearing, and, on
August 17, 2005, properly ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over the immigration judge’s
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order finding Elmour deportable, and that the matter should be transferred to this Court.
Elmour thus presses two arguments here: first, that his deportation was illegal because it
was carried out in violation of the stay, and second, that his deportation was illegal
because of the pending appeal of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
First, we consider the stay. We never ordered one, nor did Elmour ask us for one,
so the only stay in question is the one ordered by the District Court pending resolution of
the habeas petition that became this petition for review. When this Court initially
received Elmour’s petition following the REAL ID Act transfer, we notified Elmour’s
counsel that docketing fees were due. Counsel did not respond or pay the fees, and so on
September 19, 2005, we dismissed the petition. As of September 20, 2005, then, there
was no legal challenge pending to the federal government’s detention or deportation of
Elmour. Elmour did not move to reopen the petition until October 11, 2005, and we did
not grant that motion and reinstate the petition until November 9. On October 14, Elmour
was deported to England. This sequence of events moots the question of the effect that
the transfer of the petition to this Court had on the stay entered by the District Court.
Even if the stay survived the transfer, a question which we do not address, as we have had
no briefing or argument on it, it is plain that there was no stay in effect following our
dismissal of the petition, and thus no stay in effect when Elmour was deported. We note
with approval that the government did not exploit any potential legal ambiguity by
seeking to deport Elmour during the period following the transfer of the petition, when
the effect of the stay might have been thought uncertain.
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Second, we consider the pending appeal of Elmour’s motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. The Department of Homeland Security has the authority, pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(48)(A), to deport any alien following a qualifying final conviction. Elmour’s
post-sentence motion to withdraw his plea is a collateral attack, and a pending collateral
attack does not render a conviction non-final for any purpose. See, e.g., United States v.
Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164 (1982). Elmour’s conviction was final, and his deportation was
legal. The pendency of his appeal of the denial of his plea withdrawal motion has no
effect on the legality of his deportation.
To be sure, if in due course Elmour prevails on his ineffective assistance claim and
is permitted to withdraw his guilty plea, then he will no longer have a final conviction for
immigration purposes. See Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[A]n alien
whose conviction is vacated on collateral attack because the alien’s trial counsel was
ineffective under the Sixth Amendment, no longer stands ‘convicted’ for immigration
purposes.”) In that case, we expect that his return to the United States, for retrial if the
territorial government so decides, would be a matter of course. But his ineffective
assistance claim has not yet been decided.
Finally, no issues remain to be resolved in the District Court. The REAL ID Act
provided that all habeas corpus petitions challenging the removal of aliens pending when
that Act took effect be converted to petitions for review and transferred to this Court, 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), and that our review “shall be the sole and exclusive means” of
resolving all legal challenges to government’s authority to deport an alien, including
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challenges based on “any habeas corpus provision.” See Papageorgiou v. Gonzales, 413
F.3d 356, 358 (3d Cir. 2005) (interpreting transfer and jurisdictional provisions). As to
the legality of the government’s deportation of Elmour, Congress has entrusted review of
that question solely to the Courts of Appeals.
As to the legality of Elmour’s detention, conceived as an independent issue distinct
from his deportation, we express no opinion on whether, if Elmour had not been deported
but remained in DHS custody, jurisdiction might have persisted in the District Court over
a habeas corpus cause of action challenging only his detention. That question is not
before us because Elmour has been deported. Any habeas claim pertaining solely to his
detention that otherwise would have survived our denial of this petition has been mooted.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition will be denied.
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